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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE TAXABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL GRANTS
Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,' excluding from
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §117 reads as follows:
SEC. 117. SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-In the case of an individual, gross income
does not include-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as
defined in section 151(e)(4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clinical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but
only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
(b) LIMrrATIONS.-
(1) INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CANDIDATES FOR DEGREE.-In the
case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an
educational institution (as defined in section 151(e)(4)),
subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount
received which represents payment for teaching, research,
or other services in the nature of part-time employment
required as a condition to receiving the scholarship or the
fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other services are
required of all candidates (whether or not recipients of
scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as
a condition of receiving such degree, such teaching, re-
search, or other services shall not be regarded as part-time
employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
(2) INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT CANDIDATES FOR DEGREES.-In
the case of an individual who is not a candidate for a degree
at an educational institution (as defined in section
151(e)(4)), subsection (a) shall apply only if the condition
in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and then only within the
limitations provided in subparagraph (B).
(A) CONDITIONS FOR EXCLUSION.-The grantor of the
scholarship or fellowship grant is-
(i) an organization described in section 501(c) (3)
which is exempt from tax under section 501(a),
(ii) a foreign government,
(iii) an international organization, or a bina-
tional or multinational educational and cultural
foundation or commission created or continued pur-
suant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Ex-
change Act of 1961, or
(iv) the United States, or an instrumentality or
agency thereof, or a State, a territory, or a possession
of the United States, or any political subdivision
thereof, or the District of Columbia.
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gross income amounts received as scholarships or fellowships, was
drafted to eliminate the need for case-by-case determinations of the
taxability to the recipient of such grants. 2 However, this purpose has
not been met, since neither §117 nor the companion regulation 3 pro-
vides a clear test for determining when educational grants may be
excluded from gross income.4 The degree of failure is revealed by an
increasing volume of litigation over the taxability of scholarships and
fellowships. While it is clear that educational grants resembling out-
right gifts' are not taxable, the tax status of grants which bear a work
(B) ExTEr OF EXCLUSION.-The amount of the scholar-
ship or fellowship grant excluded under subsection (a)(1) in
any taxable year shall be limited to an amount equal to $300
times the number of months for which the recipient received
amounts under the scholarship or fellowship grant during
such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed
under subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to
exclude under this section for a period of 36 months
(whether or not consecutive) amounts received as a scholar-
ship or fellowship grant while not a candidate for a degree
at an educational institution (as defined in section
151(e)(4)).
2H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954) states:
Your committee's bill sets forth rules for determining the extent
to which scholarships and fellowship grants are to be included in gross
income and eliminates the existing confusion as to whether such pay-
ments are to be treated as income or as gifts. The present statute and
regulations do not cover these grants. The basic ruling of the Internal
Revenue Service which states that the amount of a grant or a fellow-
ship is includible in gross income unless it can be established to be a
gift provides no clear-cut method of distinguishing between taxable
and nontaxable grants. Hence, the tax status of these grants must be
decided on a case-by-case method.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954).
3Treas. Reg. §1.117 (1956), the pertinent portions of which appear in notes 31-33
infra.
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §61(a) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all
income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to)
the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and
similar items.
5rhe present test for determining the taxability of educational grants resembles
that for gifts, but the standards are not identical. Section 102(a) of the 1954 Code
excludes from gross income the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance. The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960),
found that the statutory definition of the word "gift" was narrower than the traditional
meaning. At common law, a gift was "a voluntary executed transfer of his property by
one to another, without any consideration or compensation therefor .... " The Su-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
requirement is uncertain. In its only consideration of this question,6
the Supreme Court, like the Congress, failed to establish criteria with
which to resolve the uncertainty.
Although a portion of the recent litigation involving the taxability
of educational grants parallels issues settled by previous §117 deci-
sions,7 most actions appear to be attempts by taxpayers to distinguish
their particular situations from a generally unfavorable body of exist-
ing case law. Not all taxpayers seeking exclusion of scholarships or
fellowships have been students attempting to establish a career base.
Some are businessmen or professionals who return to school to im-
prove old skills or to acquire new ones.8 Others are professors or other
members of the academic community researching areas of particular
interest.9 Because all exemptions from income are construed nar-
rowly,0 all taxpayers must perform the difficult task of proving that
payments received are not taxable income. This difficulty is com-
pounded by the lack of distinct guidelines for determining the taxa-
bility of educational grants. In light of the present state of confusion,
it would appear that the Congress should revise §117 to operate from
the basic premise that scholarships and fellowship grants are taxable,
excluding from gross income only those payments extended by disin-
terested grantors without a reasonable expectation of return., The
preme Court held that "a gift in the statutory sense ... proceeds from a 'detached
and disinterested generosity ... out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like
impulses.'" 363 U.S. at 285. Thus, the Court found that a lack of legal or moral
obligation to make payment is insufficient to show the existence of a gift. Instead,
taxability is a function of the transferor's intention with which payment, however
voluntary, has been made. The proper test becomes "one that inquires what the basic
reason for [the grantor's] conduct was in fact-the dominant reason that explains his
action in making the transfer." 363 U.S. at 286. Accord, Fanning v. Conley, 357 F.2d
37 (2d Cir. 1966); Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962); United States
v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960). See generally Klein, An Enigma in the
Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift", 48 MINN. L. Rxv. 215 (1963).
Determination of the dominant reason for transfer of payment does not aid the defini-
tion of the taxability of educational grants.
'Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
he duplication of litigation may be attributed in part to the large number of
taxpayers who choose to handle their cases pro se. See, e.g., Allen J. Workman, 43 P-
H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 (Jan. 14, 1974); Paul R. Zehnder, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 253 (Nov.
21, 1973).
"See, e.g., Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
'See, e.g., Louis C. Vaccaro, 58 T.C. 721 (1972).
"E.g., Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 48-49 (1949); Helvering v. North-
west Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940).
"A similar approach is used in §74 governing prizes and awards. These items are
generally included in gross income, but limited exceptions are provided for items which
take the form of gifts. Little litigation has arisen under this section.
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result would be a reversion to the test under the 1939 Code for deter-
mining the taxability of educational grants.
Taxability Under the 1939 Code
A "gift vs. compensation" test was used under the 1939 Code as
the standard for determining whether an educational grant was taxa-
ble as gross income.12 A scholarship or fellowship was excludable from
gross income only if deemed a gift,'M and the definition of gift was
construed narrowly. 4 As a result, educational grants could be ex-
cluded only where no services were required as consideration for these
awards. If the recipient applied his skill and training toward re-
quired research or other objectives of the grantor, the grant was con-
sidered compensation for the required project rather than a gift for
furthering the recipient's general educational development.'"
The gift vs. compensation test was applied in four almost identi-
cal cases in which graduate students received research fellowships
from outside sources through their universities. 7 Although each tax-
"2The 1939 Code contained no separate provision covering the taxation of educa-
tional grants. Consequently, these items were accorded the same treatment as other
gifts.
"1Iirr. REV. CODE OF 1939, §22(b) provided in part:
The following items shall not be excluded in gross income and shall
be exempt from taxation under this chapter:
(3) GIFTS, BEQUESTS, DEVISES, AND INHERITANCES. The value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.
I4 .T. 4056, 1951-2 CuM. BULL. 8. See also Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S.
711 (1952).
'5I.T. 4056, 1951-2 CuM. BULL. at 10 provided in part:
The amount of a grant or fellowship award is includible in gross
income unless it can be established that such amount is a gift. If a
grant or fellowship award is made for the training and education of
an individual, either as part of his program in acquiring a degree or
in otherwise furthering his educational development, no services ren-
dered as consideration therefor, the amount of the grant or award is a
gift which is excludable from gross income. However, when the recipi-
ent of a grant or fellowship applies his skill and training to advance
research, creative work, or some other project or activity, the essential
elements of a gift as contemplated by Section 22(b)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code are not present, and the amount of the grant or fellow-
ship is includible in the recipient's gross income.
,,Id.
"William Evers, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 179 (1961) (the controversy arose from
funds received in 1953 and was governed by the 1939 Code); Ti Li Loo, 22 T.C. 220
(1954); Robert F. Doerge, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 140 (1952); Ephriam Banks, 17 T.C.
1386 (1952).
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payer used the results of his research in a doctoral thesis, the Tax
Court found that the fellowships constituted compensation and thus
taxable income because the skilled services of the recipients were
directed toward fixed objectives of the grantors. 8 A different result
was reached in George Winchester Stone, 9 in which the grantor did
not stand to benefit from research conducted by the recipient. The
taxpayer, a university professor, received a fellowship from the Gug-
genheim Foundation to finance independent research in a topic of
his choosing. He was under no obligation to make interim or final
reports to the Foundation, nor was he required to account for his
time. A divided court scrutinized the intent of the grantor, and the
majority concluded:
It is obvious that the foundation intended [the fellowship] as
a gift. The object of the foundation is to aid scholars, scientists,
and artists in the prosecution of their labors. The donor of the
capital fund stated that the income was to be used to provide
opportunities for men and women to carry on advanced study.
The secretary of the foundation testified that the fellowship
awards were intended as gifts."°
Stone is easily distinguished from the four cases mentioned above.
The Guggenheim Foundation retained no interest in, and received no
benefit from, Stone's research. Once a Guggenheim Fellowship was
approved, the recipient was subject only to the condition that he
engage in no employment during the period of his appointment. In
contrast, the grantors of the four other research fellowships sought
substantive results in specific areas of research, and they paid for
services necessary to attain these ends. Consequently, these latter
grantors regulated many aspects of the recipient's research activity.2'
Despite the scarcity of litigation, the consistency of case law, and the
reasonable simplicity in determining the taxability of educational
grants under the 1939 Code, Congress believed that the lack of spe-
cific statutory treatment was confusing and incapable of providing
IREvers received a grant from the U.S. Public Health Service to research the effects
of carbon dioxide concentrations. Working for the same agency, Ti Li Loo researched
possible antimalarial drugs. Banks investigated for the Navy Department the reaction
of various materials to light, and three pharmaceutical companies paid Doerge a com-
posite grant to research acid derivatives.
1923 T.C. 254 (1954).
2id. at 261.
"The taxpayer in Banks, for example, was required to work 35 hours per week and
to prepare periodic written reports on his findings.
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clearcut guidelines to taxpayers. 2 Thus, the 1954 Code distinguishes
scholarships and fellowship grants23 from prizes
24 and gifts.2
Taxability Under the 1954 Code
In general, Congress in the 1954 Code excluded scholarships and
fellowships with their incidental expenses from gross income.26 How-
ever, limitations centering around a work requirement prevent pro
forma exclusion of such payments, thereby precluding simple deter-
mination of their taxability. For example, degree candidates are not
permitted to exclude "payment for teaching, research, or other serv-
ices in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition
to receiving the scholarship or fellowship grant" unless such work is
required of all candidates. 27 In addition, individuals who are not can-
didates for degrees are only permitted to exclude payments from
certain statutorily specified grantors.2 This exclusion is limited to
the 36-month period after eligibility commences and to "an amount
equal to $300 times the number of months for which the recipient
received amounts under the scholarship or fellowship grant during
such taxable year . "2. 9
Regulation §1.117,11 unlike its companion section in the Code,
defines the terms "scholarship ' '3' and "fellowship grant ' 32 and lists
payments which fall outside these definitions. 33 Not excludable from
2H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954), the relevant part of which
appears in note 2 supra.
2 3_rr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 117, the text of which appears in note 1 supra.241d. at § 74.
21M. at § 102.
"Id. at § 117(a).
17M. at § 117(b)(1).
Id. at § 117(b)(2)(A). Exclusion is only allowed if the grantor is the United
States, a federal agency, a government subdivision, an international organization or
the like, or a tax-exempt organization.
"Id. at § 117(b)(2)(B).
'-Treas. Reg. § 1.117 (1956).
3'Id. at § 1.117-3(a) defines "scholarship" as "an amount paid or allowed to, or
for the benefit of, a student, whether an undergraduate or a graduate, to aid such
individual in pursuing his studies."
"Id. at § 1.117-3(c) defines "fellowship grant" as "an amount paid or allowed to,
or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research."
'Id. at § 1.117-4 provides in part:
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be
amounts received as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose
of section 117:
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gross income are any amounts "paid as compensation for services or
primarily for the benefit of the grantor. ' 3 This willingness of the
Treasury Department to specifically define operative terms and ex-
ceptions from them caused Regulation §1.117 to assume a role greater
than simply supporting its companion Code section. 5 As a result,
determination of the taxability of educational grants, uncomplicated
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for
the benefit of the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2,
any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual
to enable him to pursue studies or research, if such amount
represents either compensation for past, present, or future
employment services or represents payment for services
which are subject to the direction or supervision of the gran-
tor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an
individual to enable him to pursue studies or research pri-
marily for the benefit of the grantor. However, amounts paid
or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him
to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose
of section 117 if the primary purpose of the studies or re-
search is to further the education and training of the recipi-
ent in his individual capacity and the amount provided by
the grantor for such purpose does not represent compensa-
tion or payment for the services described in subparagraph
(1) of this paragraph. Neither the fact that the recipient is
required to furnish reports of his progress to the grantor, nor
the fact that the results of his studies or research may be of
some incidental benefit to the grantor shall, of itself, be
considered to destroy the essential character of such amount
as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
3,Id.
=T'he definitions of "scholarship" and "fellowship grant" contained in Regulation
§ 1.117-3 were found valid by the Supreme Court in Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741
(1969), as a lawful extension of the Commissioner's rulemaking power. Id. at 751. In
addition, the Court affirmed the validity of Regulation § 1.117-4(c), which lists pay-
ments not entitled to treatment as educational grants. Id. at 755. The taxpayers in
Bingler argued that the regulation conflicted with the statute, but the Court found that
the regulation served to determine whether funds have the characteristics necessary
to constitute a scholarship or fellowship grant. Carefully examining the legislative
history, the Court concluded that any desire to encourage financial aid to education
through tax relief "must be reconciled with an apparent congressional intent ...to
tax amounts that represent compensation for services performed." Id. at 755 n.27.
Accord, Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961); Elmer L. Reese, 45 T.C.
407 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Howard Littman, 42 T.C.
503 (1964); Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959). Contra, Lawrence E. Broni-
witz, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 221 (1968).
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under the 1939 Code test, became a cumbersome and uncertain pro-
cess.
Both the statute and the regulation spawned tests for determining
the taxability of educational grants. While in many factual situations
application of any of the tests would produce an identical result,36 on
some sets of facts their different approaches might produce conflict-
ing results.3 7 The "primary purpose" test, derived from Regulation
§1.117-4(c)(2), denotes the earliest treatment of scholarships and fel-
lowships under the 1954 Code.3 8 Unlike the gift vs. compensation test
under the 1939 Code, the primary purpose test allowed exclusion of
certain educational grants from gross income even though some serv-
ices were required in consideration therefor. Used by the Third and
Fifth Circuits, 39 the test required assessment of whether a payment
was made for the primary benefit of the grantor or the recipient. In
Ussery v. United States,4" for example, the taxpayer was a state em-
ployee on leave of absence at full pay while completing her education.
Basing its conclusion on legislative records and policy manuals of the
state, the Fifth Circuit found that the primary purpose of the grant
was not to assist the taxpayer's educational development but was to
improve state departmental efficiency. Accordingly, the court held
that the grant constituted taxable income."
3"For example, courts have found payments to an employee on leave of absence to
obtain a degree taxable under all tests. See note 70 infra.
WFor example, the choice of test has been decisive in determining the taxability
of payments by outside sponsors in exchange for part-time student services. See note
66 and accompanying text infra.
"The primary purpose test was apparently first used and referred to by name in
Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
"Commissioner v. Ide, 335 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964); Ussery v. United States, 296
F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961). The primary purpose test was also applied exclusively in
Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958), and Chandler P. Bhalla, 35
T.C. 13 (1960).
4D296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
"The courts adopting the primary purpose test did not agree on the proper deter-
mination of the primary beneficiary of a grant. For example, in Ussery the grantor's
intention controlled this determination, but the actual effect of the grant was decisive
in Commissioner v. Ide, 335 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964). The taxpayers in Ide contended
that a grant from the Reserve Officer Training Corps to their son for college tuition
and incidentals was a scholarship. They needed to prove the existence of a § 117
scholarship in order to show that they contributed more than one-half of their son's
support and thus be able to claim him as an exemption. The Third Circuit held that
the primary purpose of the ROTC grant was to aid the student in his individual
capacity and therefore was not to be included in the cost of support for the purpose of
determining dependency. This procedural conflict as to the determination of the pri-
mary beneficiary produced additional litigation and compounded difficulty in determi-
nation of the taxability of educational grants.
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The "indicia of compensation" test, the second standard for de-
termining the taxability of educational grants, was derived from
§117(b)(1) and Regulation §1.117-4(c)(1). 2 Unlike the gift vs. com-
pensation test, the indicia of compensation test allowed exclusion of
a scholarship or fellowship extended with strings attached so long as
payment did not represent compensation for services rendered. The
test was used by the Sixth Circuit in Stewart v. United States,4 3 in
which the taxpayer, as in Ussery, was a state employee on leave of
absence to obtain a master's degree. The court held that the continu-
ing nature of the employment relationship, as revealed by the tax-
payer's retention of state civil service status with all benefits, indi-
cated that payments to the employee were "compensation for past,
present, or future services."4 Because some mutuality of benefit ex-
ists in all employment relationships, the Sixth Circuit found indicia
of compensation as a more meaningful test than primary purpose.
Even more confusing for taxpayers than the simple split among
the circuits as to the appropriate test was the question of the proper
method of application of these tests. Although each had been used
separately in other cases,45 the primary purpose and indicia of com-
pensation tests were combined in the test employed by the Tenth
Circuit in Woddail v. Commissioner," in which the taxpayer was a
12Although earlier courts had determined whether payments represented compen-
sation for services, the name "indicia of compensation" was apparently not associated
with such a test until Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966).
-363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966). Compensation was also the only issue discussed in
Lawrence Spruch, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63 (1961), where the taxpayer used his work
to fulfill a requirement for a degree. The court did not apply primary purpose, believing
that the exception in § 117(b)(1) did not allow use of any test derived from the regula-
tion. Id. at 350. In Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969), the Supreme Court disa-
greed and held that the regulation provided valid criteria for determining the very
existence of a scholarship or fellowship grant within the statutory meaning.
"Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1966).
"See cases cited in notes 39 and 43 supra.
46321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963). Both the primary purpose and indicia of compensa-
tion tests were also applied in decisions affirmed by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits.
In Anderson v. United States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 726 (D. Minn. 1960), appeal
dismissed, 289 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1961), the Eighth Circuit rejected a Government
appeal from a verdict in favor of the taxpayer, a master's candidate with a "clinical
fellowship" from a veterans hospital. It was not disputed that the taxpayer was paid
compensation for services performed. The jury had been instructed to resolve first the
factual dispute of whether all candidates for the master's degree were required to
perform similar services. If it found that some candidates were not obligated to perform
similar services, payments received were taxable. However, if it determined that all
candidates had the same work requirement, the jury was to consider next the primary
purpose of the grant. Id. at 727. Because the jury found that the exception to
§ 117(b)(1) was applicable, it also considered the primary purpose of the grant. In
19741
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resident physician at a veterans hospital. As a government employee,
the taxpayer worked a regular six day workweek and received all civil
service benefits. Observing that the residents filled an essential role
in hospital services, the Tenth Circuit found that the primary pur-
pose of payments to the taxpayer was to provide treatment for pa-
tients rather than to facilitate the recipient's education. In holding
that the payments were taxable, the court also found that the tax-
payer was compensated for his skillls as a physician.
In an apparent attempt to resolve the confusion, the Supreme
Court in Bingler v. Johnson47 offered a new standard for determining
the taxability of educational grants. The "quid pro quo" test, requires
assessment of whether any amount received is the product of a
bargained-for relationship or is simply a no-strings attached grant.
The taxpayers in Bingler received payments from their employer,
Westinghouse, while on leaves of absence to write doctoral theses.' s
The payments provided for educational expenses and living allow-
ances of between 70 and 90 per cent of a taxpayer's prior salary plus
"adders" depending on family size. 9 The taxpayers retained their
Elmer L. Reese, 45 T.C. 407 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967), in
which the taxpayer was a student teacher, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a Tax Court
decision which applied both tests in reaching a decision in favor of taxability.
The primary purpose and indicia of compensation tests were applied jointly in
many other pre-Bingler cases. Taylor v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5246
(E.D. Ark. 1968); Lingl v. Charles, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 410 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Pappas
v. United States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1276 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Reiffen v. United
States, 376 F.2d 883 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Aloysius J. Proskey, 51 T.C. 918 (1969); Edward
A. Jamieson, 51 T.C. 635 (1969); Oscar A. Arnaud, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 290 (1968);
Lawrence E. Broniwitz, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 221 (1968) (alternative holding); Ken-
neth J. Kopecky, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 215 (1968); Donald R. DiBona, 37 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 214 (1968); Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389 (1968); David E. Mark, 36 P-
H Tax Ct. Mem. 222 (1967); Howard Littman, 42 T.C. 503 (1964); Alex L. Sweet,
40 T.C. 403 (1963); Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963); William Wells, 40T.C. 40 (1963);
Aileene Evans, 34 T.C. 720 (1960); Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 (1960); Frank Thomas
Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959).
7394 U.S. 741 (1969).
' The leave of absence was the second phase in the Westinghouse program for
employee postgraduate study. During the first phase, an employee held his regular job
and received up to eight hours "release time" a week, to a maximum of 156 hours a
year, in order to attend one of two area universities. At the end of the first phase, an
employee applied for a leave of absence to prepare his thesis. As part of the application
for this leave of absence, he submitted a proposed dissertation topic to Westinghouse
for approval. Id. at 743.
"The tax status of the educational expenses was not an issue in Bingler. The Court
noted that these sums were "conceptually includable" in gross income, but would
probably be offset by educational expense deductions permissible under Regulation
§ 1.162-5. Id. at 744 n.9.
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seniority and continued to enjoy all company benefits. They were
required to submit periodic progress reports to Westinghouse during
their absence and were obligated to return to the corporation for at
least two years upon completion of their studies." The Court found
that the taxpayers had received "bargained-for payments, given only
as a 'quo' in return for the quid of services rendered ... ."-5 Such
payments, the Court held, should not be excludable from income.
The Supreme Court found that the second paragraph of Regulation
§1.117-4(c),5" denying the exclusion of any amount paid to enable the
recipient to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the
grantor, was merely an adjunct to the preceding paragraph rendering
taxable compensation for employment services. The Court explained:
By this paragraph, the Treasury has supplemented the first
[paragraph] in order to impose tax on bargained-for arrange-
ments that do not create an employer-employee relation, as,
for example, in the case of an independent contractor. But the
general idea is the same: "scholarship" or "fellowship" does
not include arrangements where the recipient receives money
and in return provides a quid pro quo."3
Thus, the quid pro quo test is the present standard for determining
the taxability of scholarships and fellowship grants.
The quid pro quo test allows fewer exclusions than did either of
the two earlier tests arising under the 1954 Code. If the grantor re-
ceives or may reasonably expect to receive nonincidental reciprocal
benefits, the grant is taxable even if the primary purpose is to benefit
the recipient and payments do not represent compensation for serv-
ices. The types of payments taxable under the new test are very
similar to those taxed under the gift vs. compensation test of the 1939
Code."4 Under both tests, unless the grantor has a disinterested gener-
osity as revealed in a no-strings attached scholarship or fellowship,
payments would be taxable as ordinary income. 5 However, the quid
"One of the taxpayers began his leave of absence before Westinghouse required
all employees on educational leave of absence to agree in writing to return for two years
future employment. However, he was advised that he was "expected" to return to
Westinghouse for a period of time not less than the duration of his leave. Id. at 744
n.7.
51d. at 757.
"2For text of Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c), see note 33 supra.
51394 U.S. at 758 n.32.
5The expression "quid pro quo" was apparently first used in relation to educa-
tional grants in the dissenting opinion in George Winchester Stone, 23 T.C. 254, 265
(1954) (Turner, J., dissenting), a case decided under the gift vs. compensation test.
"Compare Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969), with Ti Li Loo, 22 T.C. 220
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pro quo test, unlike the gift vs. compensation test, permits an inci-
dental return to the grantor.56 The amount of return permitted under
the no-strings attached requirement is unclear. The quid pro quo test,
as set forth by the Supreme Court, is not sufficiently explicative to
provide a conclusive answer. This deficiency becomes particularly
apparent in examining treatment of payments to resident physicians
and psychiatrists.
Payments received by resident physicians and psychiatrists, not
candidates for degreees, are generally considered quid pro quo and
taxable regardless of the nature of the grantor institution.5 7 However,
in Leathers v. United States, 8 the Eighth Circuit let stand a jury
verdict in favor of the taxpayers, licensed physicians serving as resi-
dents at the University of Arkansas Medical Center. In upholding the
finding that payments were primarily for the benefit of the recipients,
the court noted that professional responsibilities could be handled
without the residents. Because of the teaching nature of the Center,
patients were not billed for services provided. Residents, permitted
(1954) and Ephriam Banks, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952).
"Compare Shuff v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Va. 1971), with George
Winchester Stone, 23 T.C. 254 (1954). For discussion of Shuff, see note 70 infra; for
discussion of Stone, see text accompanying note 19 supra.
"Parr v. United States, 469 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1972); Hembree v. United States,
464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972) (jury decision for taxpayer overturned); Quast v. United
States, 428 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1970); Biggs v. United States, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
5776 (E.D. Ky. 1971); Tobin v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 239 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
Kwass v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 186 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Wertzenberger v. United
States, 315 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.
1971); Coggins v. United States, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5775 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Paul
R. Zehnder, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 253 (Nov. 21, 1973); Enrique Kaufman, 42 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 121 (May 31, 1973); Emerson Emory, 42 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 55 (Mar.
5, 1973); Richard F. Bergeron, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 248 (1972); Bayard L. Moffit,
41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 187 (1972); Arthur Calick, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1972);
Larry R. Taylor, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 20 (1972); Ernest Griffin Moore, 40 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 314 (1971); Brian T. Steinhaus, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 279 (1971); Dee L.
Fuller, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 259 (1971); Michael D. Birnbaum, 40 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 231 (1971), af'd mem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Frederick Fisher, 56 T.C.
1201 (1971); Emerson Emory, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 191 (1971); William K. Rundell,
Jr., 40 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 40 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1972);
Edward A. Ballerini, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 334 (1970); Janis Dimants, Jr., 39 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 257 (1970); Marvin Flicker, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 252 (1970); Austin
M. Katz, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 116 (1970). Cf. Esfandiar Kadivar, 42 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 95 (Apr. 24, 1973) (resident and intern); Jacob T. Moll, 57 T.C. 579 (1972)
(intern); John M. Gullo, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 331 (1971) (intern); Irwin S. Anderson,
54 T.C. 1547 (1970) (resident and intern). See also Dennis Dale Brenneise, 43 P-H Tax.
Ct. Mem. 1 (Jan. 7, 1974) (exclusion denied resident in pharmacy).
5-471 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
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a two-week vacation only if possible, were often rotated to another
hospital and were consequently ineligible for the Center's retirement
plan. Instead, they were offered a health insurance plan on a policy
separate from other Center personnel. However, more importantly,
pay increases to residents at the Center were based on experience
rather than need. The court held that there was sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury's findings that services provided by residents were
insubstantial and that payments did not constitute a quid pro quo.
By deciding in favor of the taxpayers, the Eighth Circuit in
Leathers elected not to follow the direction of the Fourth Circuit in
Hembree v. United States.9 As in Leathers, the taxpayers in
Hembree were physicians who rotated in their residencies between
facilities, the primary one of which was statutorily designated a train-
ing hospital. Residents received both group health insurance and
paid vacations as did other members of the hospital staff. Finding
that the residents provided valuable services which reduced the hos-
pital's need for other doctors, the court disregarded the statutory
denomination of the institution, overturned the jury verdict, and
determined the existence of a substantial quid pro quo.
Only the questionable finding of fact in Leathers that resident
physicians were not indispensible personnel legitimately distin-
guishes that case from Hembree."0 Aside from some minor variations
in the fringe benefits extended, the basic factual settings of the two
case are similar and do not suggest the absence of substantial return
to the grantor institutions. Residents in both Leathers and Hembree
received uniform payment and were responsible for providing health
care for patients under the control and direction of experienced
medical personnel. The providing of these services created additional
time for other staff members to engage in related activities.
The Eighth Circuit made no attempt to distinguish Hembree on
the basis of substantiality of services performed, a distinction which,
according to a strong dissent, would have been rendered impossible
by the compelling similarity in the factual situations. Instead, the
Leathers court disposed of Hembree as a correction by the Fourth
Circuit of an erroneous jury instruction which allowed examination
of the purpose of the hospital facility rather than the purpose of the
grant. Because the court failed to distinguish the two very similar
factual situations, the dissent criticized the majority for making it
virtually impossible "for resident physicians to know without litiga-
5'464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972).
"The jury in Leathers heard conflicting testimony before deciding that the services
of the Center's residents were not indispensible.
1974]
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tion whether they owe taxes upon stipends paid them by the institu-
tions in which they train."'" The position taken by the dissent ap-
pears to be the more sound. It is difficult to believe that skilled
physicians can treat patients for a year, even as a learning experience,
and perform only incidental services. Moreover, Leathers, following
numerous decisions in favor of the taxability of payments to resi-
dents,' 2 leaves unanswered questions as to the future status of such
grants.
Although payments to resident physicians constitute a major
source of conflict under the quid pro quo test, litigation has encom-
passed other areas. Determination of the taxability of payments by
outside sponsors in exchange for part-time student services illustrates
problems in application of the test as it concerns candidates for de-
grees. In Ide v. United States ,63 seventy-three former students at the
General Motors Institute sued for recovery of taxes. The students,
participants in a five-year accredited undergraduate program in engi-
neering and industrial administration, were all sponsored by the
Oldsmobile Division of General Motors. 64 During the first four years,
students alternated six weeks on campus with six weeks at the spon-
soring unit. The fifth year was spent entirely at the sponsoring unit.
Although the sponsor's work projects became more technical each
year, only in "very limited and temporary circumstances" 5 did a
student replace a regular employee. The students received all em-
ployee benefits and Oldsmobile Division paid them an hourly rate
sufficient to cover tuition, food, and lodging. The court found that
although the GMI program was a "broad educational experience,
even at the expense of immediate efficiency and productivity . . .
[t]he entire thrust of the payment plan is aimed at obtaining for
11471 F.2d at 871.
U2Note 57 supra. Under the earlier tests, litigation on the taxability of payments
to residents also produced no unanimity. Decisions for the taxpayer were reached in
Pappas v. United States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1276 (E.D. Ark. 1967), and Wrobleski
v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958). Decisions against the taxpayer were
reached in the following cases: Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.
1963); Taylor v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5246 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Lingl v.
Charles, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 410 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Aloysius J. Proskey, 51 T.C. 918
(1969); Oscar A. Arnaud, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 290 (1968) Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C.
64 (1960). Courts applied primary purpose and indicia of compensation tests jointly
in all cases except Wrobleski. In that case, only the primary purpose test was used.
See also Aileene Evans, 34 T.C. 720 (1960) (exclusion permitted non-degree candidate
in psychiatric nursing program by primary purpose and indicia of compensation tests).
"32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5366 (W.D. Mich. June 12, 1973).
"Applicants to the school were required to obtain the sponsorship of a division of
General Motors.
132 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 5369.
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General Motors a future cadre of experienced and qualified engineer-
ing talent."6 Thus, while the students had no legal obligation to
accept permanent employment with the Oldsmobile Division after
graduation, the court held that a quid pro quo nevertheless existed
because the grantor could reasonably expect recruiting successes as
a result of the program. The court found that the dominance of Gen-
eral Motors in the automotive industry, the orientation of the engi-




.'Accord, Michael A. Smith, 60 T.C. 279 (1973). Cf. Ehrhart v. Commissioner, 470
F.2d 940 (lst Cir. 1973). The two taxpayers in Ehrhart were students in the graduate
school of actuarial science at Northeastern University. The school admitted to this
highly technical program only employees of sponsoring insurance companies. The
school required that the students work for their sponsoring companies during the
sixteen week period between semesters. However, during the ten week semesters, stu-
dents were in no way subject to the control of their sponsors. Their salaries were
reduced to reflect time away from the companies, but they received tuition and living
expenses for the period at school. Payments to one taxpayer were proportionally re-
duced for the entire year to reflect these calculations. The other taxpayer received his
regular salary for 32 weeks and a living allowance for 20 weeks. Both taxpayers received
all benefits enjoyed by regular company employees. Although the taxpayers had no
commitment for future employment, the First Circuit held that the trier of fact could
reasonably infer the existence of a quid pro quo relationship by examining the recruit-
ment motive of the insurance companies. The Tax Court, although finding in fact that
recruiting efforts of the insurance companies through this work-study program were
less successful than through other programs, held that "so-called scholarship grants
by profit-oriented institutions to present or prospective employees invite careful scru-
tiny." Lawrence Ehrhart, 57 T.C. 872, 880 (1972). The Court elaborated:
[Aibsence of a contractual undertaking by the recipient to perform
services for his grantor does not make a payment a "scholarship"
where the evidence as a whole suggests a contrary conclusion. . . . It
does not appear that either company [here] was motivated to any
substantial degree by the usual disinterested considerations that are
characteristic of a true scholarship or fellowship.
Id. at 882.
In affirming the Tax Court's decision that no payments were excludable from gross
income under § 117, the First Circuit explicitly rejected the applicability of Lawrence
E. Broniwitz, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 221 (1968), a case decided using the tests antece-
dent to Bingler. The taxpayer in Broniwitz, a candidate for a master's degree, received
a grant from the Raytheon Corporation to cover tuition and expenses at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. The only requirements were that he submit progress
reports on his studies to Raytheon and that he accept summer work with the corpora-
tion. Raytheon neither approved nor directed his academic work and it did not seek a
commitment for future permanent employment. The court held that payments to the
student during the academic year were not compensation for past, present, or future
services, nor were they for the primary purpose of benefiting the grantor. Cf. Commis-
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Controversy under the quid pro quo test spans many other areas.
Courts have found a quid pro quo in teaching assistantships,"5 re-
search grants,"5 clinical fellowships,"h payments to an employee on
sioner v. Ide, 335 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964). Because one of the reasons for the corpora-
tion's grant was recruitment, Broniwitz does not withstand the quid pro quo test.
"Teaching assistantships are usually taxable to degree candidates under the quid
pro quo test. See Steinmetz v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Allen
J. Workman, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 15 (Jan. 14, 1974); Michael J. Larsen, 42 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 239 (Oct. 25, 1973); Robert N. Worthington, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 111
(1972), af'd mem., 476 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1973). However, a different result was
reached in Robert Henry Steiman, 56 T.C. 1350 (1971), where the teaching program
was marked by two major dissimilarities from the norm. First, although all candidates
had the same teaching requirement, payment was determined solely on the basis of
need. Second, unlike most student-teaching programs which free full-time instructors
from classroom situations to perform other work or research, the program in Steiman
involved close daily contact between the student-teacher and the faculty. Conse-
quently, the program was considered an added burden by faculty members and a
"learning experience" by student participants. Id. at 1351. The court found that the
unusual makeup of this program did not create a quid pro quo relationship. Cf. Logan
v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5987 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 1973) (only fellow-
ship holders paid for fulfilling teaching requirement).
Under the pre-Bingler tests, student-teachers were unable to show that payments
received were not compensation for services rendered for the primary purpose of class-
room instruction. See Edward A. Jamieson, 51 T.C. 635 (1969); Kenneth J. Kopecky,
37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 215 (1968); Donald R. DiBona, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 214
(1968); Elmer L. Reese, 45 T.C. 407 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.
1967). In all of these cases, both the primary purpose and indicia of compensation tests
were applied. However, the facts in none of these cases presented as strong a case for
exclusion as in Steiman or Logan.
"Research grants to degree candidates have consistently been held taxable under
the quid pro quo test. In Larry L. Kreis, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 175 (1970), aff'd per
curiam, 441 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1971), the taxpayer received on HEW grant to study
the causes of school dropouts in rural communities. Despite the lack of supervision,he
was expected to average 20 hours of work per week. The taxpayer used the research in
his doctoral thesis, but the court found the existence of mutual beneft in the grant and
denied exclusion. Accord, Michaels v. United States, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1339 (E.D.
Mich. 1971); John W. Klein, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 70 (Mar. 27, 1973) (received
hourly wage); John B. Karrh, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 24 (Feb. 5, 1973). Cf. Charles F.
Wall, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1972) (bachelor's candidate); Karl Laurence Kirk-
man, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 180 (1970) (bachelor's candidate); Johnathan M. Kagan,
38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 118 (1969) (master's candidate). Decisions in favor of recipients
of research grants under the primary purpose and indicia of compensation tests in
circumstances similar to those in Kreis are no longer good precedent, because there
were no disinterested parties involved. See Lawrence Spruch, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mer.
63 (1961) (indicia of compensation); Chandler P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 13 (1960) (primary
purpose). See also Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389 (1968) (decision against taxpayer
using both tests); Alex L. Sweet, 40 T.C. 403 (1963) (decision against taxpayer using
1oth tests).
Similarly, most research grants received by individuals not candidates for degrees
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are taxable. In Frank C. Gibb, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 161 (July 24, 1973), the court
found a substantial quid pro quo relationship where the taxpayer, Gibb's wife, was
engaged in postdoctoral research in physiological chemistry on a grant awarded by the
U.S. Public Health Service and administered by the Ohio State University Research
Foundation. Listed on the payroll of the university as a "research associate," the
taxpayer was entitled to university benefits and was subject to university rules and
regulations. She was required to submit interim and final reports on her research and
was obligated to assign her rights, title, and interest in any discoveries, inventions, or
patents to the Foundation. The Tax Court fround the total absence of a no-strings
educational grant from a disinterested grantor. Accord, Robert W. Carroll, 60 T.C. 96
(1973); Beulah M. Woodfin, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49 (1972); Harvey P. Urech, 55
T.C. 434 (1970).
A contrary result was reached by the Tax Court in Louis C. Vaccaro, 58 T.C. 721
(1972), in which the taxpayer received a year's leave of absence from Marquette Uni-
versity to accept a postdoctoral fellowship administered by the University of Oregon
through a cost reimbursement contract between the U.S. Office of Education and the
Board of Higher Education for the State of Oregon. In accordance with agency require-
ments, he submitted 'time and effort" reports. As a "research assistant" the taxpayer
was paid the same salary he received at Marquette, and he was entitled to all faculty
privileges. However, the taxpayer participated in no organized or assigned projects and
was at liberty to select research designed to develop his own professional skills. The
court found the absence of a quid pro quo, concluding that no significant services were
expected as a result of the grant. The taxpayer in Frederick A. Bieberdorf, 60 T.C. 114
(1973), also prevailed in the Tax Court. Bieberdorf received a National Institute of
Health grant to research gastroenterology and liver diseases at the University of Texas
Southwestern Medical School. Although he engaged in some clinical activities, the
emphasis of the program was on research. In deciding for the taxpayer, the court
ignored the close supervision of the recipient's work and observed that he was free to
select his own goals and method of research. Accord, George L. Bailey, 60 T.C. 447
(1973) (researched nephrology and renal disease).
Research grants to individuals not candidates for degrees were consistently taxed
in pre-Bingler litigation. See Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963); Frank Thomas Bach-
mura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959). Primary purpose and indicia of compensation tests were
applied in each case.
"°Some clinical fellowships awarded to degree candidates are taxable under the
quid pro quo test. In James M. Jaeger, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 151 (July 10, 1973),
the taxpayer was seeking his master's degree in education. He received payments from
a consolidated group representing local school districts and the state superintendent
for his work in reducing pupil alienation in inner city Milwaukee schools. The taxpayer
averaged about 20 hours of work per week, mostly in direct contact with students and
their families. The Tax Court found the existence of a quid pro quo relationship,
holding that the public schools unquestionably benefited from the taxpayer's services.
However, a clinical fellowship was found excludable from gross income in Shuff
v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Va. 1971), where the taxpayer was seeking a
master's degree in hospital administration. He was not considered an employee of the
institution but it gave him a "maintenance stipend." Rotated from one department
to another, the taxpayer observed the various procedures and performed some routine
work. At the trial, hospital officials testified that although medical residents are indis-
pensible, administrative residents are not. Holding that small amounts of services of
incidental benefit do not destroy the status of payments as a scholarship, the court
found no substantial quid pro quo in the clinical internship.
Under the older tests, courts found that the primary purpose of similar hospital
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leave of absence,7 and payments to an employee for his voluntary
participation in an employer-sponsored program outside the normal
scope of his duties.72 Although the vast majority of cases have pro-
training programs was to benefit the students who did not perform substantial services,
and thus the payments were excludable from gross income. See Anderson v. United
States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 726 (D. Minn. 1960), appeal dismissed, 289 F.2d 938 (8th
Cir. 1961) (primary purpose and indicia of compensation); William Wells, 40 T.C. 40
(1963) (primary purpose).
A clinical fellowship to a non-degree candidate was found excludable from gross
income in Thomas P. Phillips, 57 T.C. 420 (1971), where the taxpayer, Phillips' wife,
received a dietetic internship from the Pennsylvania Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Public Instruction. Administered by Pennsylvania State University, the
program was an avenue to membership in the American Dietetic Association without
obtaining a master's degree. The taxpayer moved from one instituton to another,
spending periods of two to seven weeks in each place, before returning to the university
for classroom instruction or a new assignment. At each institution she spent most of
her time observing, and at no time did she replace an employee or perform services
directly beneficial to the university or to an institution. In deciding against the Com-
missioner, the Tax Court ignored the taxpayer's civil service status and found that she
moved around too often to assume any significant responsibilities. Although a rotation
of responsibilities is helpful in showing the absence of a substantial quid pro quo, it is
not necessarily dispositive. See, e.g., Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir.
1972).
7 Payments to an employee on leave of absence to obtain a degree were found
taxable by the Supreme Court in Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969). Accord, Ulak
v. United States, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5104 (S.D. Cal. 1972); H. Norman Brown, 41
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 114 (1972); Eugene W. Helms, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 110 (1972);
James G. Harper, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 106 (1972); Robert H. Kyle, 41 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 83 (1972); Norman F. Stouggard, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 311 (1971); Lowell
D. Ward, 55 T.C. 308, aff'd per curiam, 449 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1970) (although employ-
ment obligation never enforced); Jerry S. Turem, 54 T.C. 1494 (1970); Marjorie E.
Haley, 54 T.C. 642 (1970); John E. McDonald, 52 T.C. 386 (1969).
Identical results in similar employment relationships were reached under the pri-
mary purpose test in Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961), and under
the indicia of compensation test in Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir.
1966). Joint applications of both tests produced the same results in Reiffen v. United
States, 376 F.2d 883 (Ct. Cl. 1967), and David E. Mark, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 222
(1967).
72Payments received by an employee for his voluntary participation in an
employer-sponsored non-degree program outside the normal scope of his duties consti-
tute taxable income. In Marjorie Schwartz, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 151 (1969), a high
school language teacher received a five-month leave of absence to study abroad in order
to prepare for teaching a new course. The Tax Court found that the employer stood to
benefit from the venture and disallowed exclusion. A similar result was reached in
Robert W. Willie, 57 T.C. 383 (1971), in which an instructor participated in a federally
funded municipal training program to facilitate desegregation in the public schools.
He was paid on a per diem basis for his attendance. In finding that payments consti-
tuted taxable income, the Tax Court held that the government was not a disinterested
grantor but was indirectly a primary beneficiary of the program by the education of
its citizens.
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duced results unfavorable to the taxpayer, the amount of litigation
on the taxability of scholarships and fellowship grants shows no sign
of slackening.
Proposed Remedy
This continuing heavy volume of litigation shows clear failure on
the part of the Congress to legislate definitive guidelines as to the
taxability of educational grants. Enticed by a woefully ambiguous
regulation and a single inadequate Supreme Court decision, taxpay-
ers have devised many approaches by which to distinguish their par-
ticular situations from discouraging precedents. The result can only
be more litigation, more exceptions, and more inconsistencies. It will
be increasingly necessary to examine in detail all aspects of a particu-
lar factual situation, because the quid pro quo test provides insuffi-
cient resolution to the longstanding difficulty of determining the tax-
ability of educational grants.
3
The Congress should revise §117 to provide a clear test for deter-
mining when educational grants are taxable as gross income. The new
test should not permit the exclusion from taxable income of pay-
ments received by an individual who must fulfill a work requirement
of any sort in exchange for his grant. Such a concession would be
grossly unfair to those who pay taxes on earnings from employment
necessary to finance their education. However, public policy de-
mands that scholarships and fellowship grants, extended by disinter-
ested grantors lacking a reasonable expectation of return, be excluda-
ble from gross income in order to encourage educational and voca-
tional pursuits.7 4 Simultaneous application of the two propositions
creates a return to the gift vs. compensation standard of the 1939
Code. Such a reversion is sensible, since all tests under the 1954 Code
have been unsuccessful attempts to improve upon the basically sound
concept of the 1939 Code test.
The proposed reversion, if enacted, would minimize the amount
"Most courts recognize the overwhelming difficulty in determining the taxability
of scholarships and fellowship grants. For example, in the recent case of Michael J.
Larsen, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 239 (Oct. 25, 1973), the Tax Court observed that
"Section 117 presents a labyrinthine problem which can be met only in terms of the
particular facts and circumstances of each case." 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 239, at 1077.
However, a federal district court disagreed in Logan v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 5987 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 1973), and held that "this much litigated area arises
from the language of a section which is so clear that 'one would necessarily need to
consult a lawyer in order to effectively misconstrue it.' " Id. at 5988.
WSee generally Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search
for Treasury Policy, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 144.
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